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Abstract
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11 Introduction
Many researchers, including Blanchard and Simon (2000), McConnell and Perez Quiroz
(2000) and Stock and Watson (2002)), have documented a marked decline in the variance
of real activity and the variance and the persistence of in￿ ation in the US since the early
1980s. While some have questioned the statistical signi￿cance of the reported changes (see
Canova and Gambetti (2004) or Pivetta and Reis (2007)), there is agreement among macro-
economists that the nature and the causes of these changes should be careful investigated.
Taylor (1998), Sargent (1999), Clarida, et. al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
among others, have attributed the fall to a permanent alteration in the weight that in￿ ation
receives in the objective function of the monetary authority. The popular version of the
story runs as follows: the run-up of in￿ ation in the 1970s occurred because the authorities
believed that there was an exploitable trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and output. Since output
was low following the two oil shocks, the temptation to in￿ ate to bring output back, or
above its potential level, was strong. Between keeping in￿ ation low (and output low) or
in￿ ation high (and output high), the monetary authorities systematically choose the latter
option. Hence, in￿ ation in the long run turned out to be higher while output simply settled
to its potential level. Since the 1980s, the perception of the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ has
changed. The Fed has learned that it was not exploitable and concentrated on the objective
of ￿ghting in￿ ation. A low in￿ ation regime ensued, and the predictability of monetary
policy contributed to make the macroeconomic environment less volatile and the swings in
in￿ ation and output more unpredictable.
While prevalent, this view is not fully shared in the profession. Some researchers claim
that monetary policy has not displayed any permanent switch; that the same policy rule
characterizes most of the post WWII experience; that monetary policy has little in￿ uence
on output; and that good luck is responsible for the changes (see e.g. Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), Leeper and Zha (2003), Hanson (2006), Sims and Zha (2006)). Others have sug-
gested ￿ real￿reasons to explain the volatility fall (see e.g. Ireland (1999), McConnell and
Perez Quiroz (2000), Gordon (2005), or Campbell and Herkowitz (2006)).
2Some progress has been made in the investigation of these issues using empirical models
where coe¢ cients are allowed to vary over time. Sargent and Cogley (2001) and (2005), who
used a reduced form time varying coe¢ cient VAR, ￿nd evidence that supports the causation
story running from monetary policy changes to changes in the rest of the economy. Canova
and Gambetti (2004), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), who estimate structural time
varying coe¢ cients VARs, ￿nd little posterior support for this hypothesis. Since structural
VARs only use a minimal amount of the restrictions implied by the current generation of
DSGE models, one may wonder how truly structural the estimated relationships are. For
example, Ireland (2001), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006),
who explicitly condition their analyses on a small scale DSGE model, do ￿nd evidence of
policy instability.
This paper provides new evidence on the causes of output and in￿ ation volatility changes
by recursively estimating a small scale DSGE model with Bayesian techniques. Recursive
estimation provides a short cut to more complicated analyses that allow for varying taste,
technology and policy parameters into a structural model but requires estimation of second
order approximations to the solution and much more time consuming posterior simulators
(see Fernandez Villaverde and Rubio Ramirez (2007)). Also, relative to analyses where
subsamples are arbitrarily chosen, a recursive approach allows us to obtain a more solid evi-
dence on the nature of the time variations. Since the volatility of output (in￿ ation) displays
a U (inverted U) shaped pattern, conclusions may crucially depend on the selected break
point. Bayesian methods have inferential and computational advantages over traditional
maximum likelihood techniques when dealing with models which are a ￿ false￿description
of the data generating process. This is important since, despite recent attempts to make
them more realistic, DSGEs are still highly stylized; important relationships are modeled
with black-box frictions; and ad-hoc shocks are used to dynamically span the probabilis-
tic space of the data. In these situations, unrestricted maximum likelihood estimates are
often unreasonable and asymptotic standard errors, constructed assuming that the model
is ￿ true￿under the null, are uninterpretable. Posterior estimates are meaningful even for
models displaying such features. A Bayesian framework is also preferable to an approach
3that obtains estimates of the structural parameters matching a subset of impulse responses
in two respects: all the information of the model is e¢ ciently used; the trade-o⁄ between
identi￿ability and nonlinearities is dealt with in a more transparent way (see e.g. Canova
and Sala (2006)).
Rather than searching for the ￿ best￿empirical model, we take a standard speci￿cation,
popular in the theoretical literature, and show what it tells us about the causes of the
changes experienced in the US. We consider ￿rst standard subsample analysis and then
estimate the model a number times using overlapping samples, spanning a twenty year
window over the period 1955-2002, and analyze the evolution of the posterior distributions
of the structural parameters. Our analysis is geared to shed light on two issues. First, we
would like to know which parameters are drifting over time, if any. Second, we would like
to know which variation has contributed most to the observed changes in the volatility of
output and in￿ ation.
While it is common to examine this latter question via counterfactuals where parameters
from di⁄erent subsamples are switched (see e.g. Boivin and Giannoni (2006)), this practice
violates a basic principle underlying the Lucas critique - agents are unaware that changes
may repeatedly occur - and therefore fails to provide a reliable answer. Our approach will
be to estimate unrestricted and restricted speci￿cations, examine by how much the ￿t of the
model changes and the consequences of restricting some parameters on fraction of output
and in￿ ation variability explained by the model.
We ￿nd instabilities in all the parameters of interest. Consistent with the common
wisdom, the in￿ ation coe¢ cient in the policy rule increases if the sample includes only
the years after 1982. However, changes are relatively small and often insigni￿cant. The
parameters describing the private sector also change and variations are signi￿cantly larger.
Finally, the covariance matrix of the shocks changes over time and the adjustments are
broadly in line with those reported in the VAR literature. These results are robust to the
choice of policy rule: a rule which makes the interest rate responds to output growth rather
than the output gap, or to future rather than current developments in the economy produce
qualitatively similar results.
4We show that changes in the parameters of the policy rule and the covariance matrix
of the shocks are the most important to account for the changes in the volatility of output
and in￿ ation: restricting them to be unchanged over the samples makes the ￿t of the
model drop dramatically and the decline in volatility disappear. Interestingly, restricting
the parameters of the policy rule imply a much higher in￿ ation volatility, while restricting
the standard deviations of the shocks increases the variance of output by about 10 times.
Hence, the changes in the volatility of the two variables may have di⁄erent causes.
In sum, it appears that both the ￿ good policy￿and the ￿ good luck￿hypotheses have
some support in the data. However, it is only by combining the two that one can jointly
account for the decline in the variability of real activity and in￿ ation over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the
estimation technique. Section 3 presents the basic results and a few robustness exercises.
Section 4 compares our results to those in the literature. Section 5 studies what explains
the observed changes in the volatility of output and in￿ ation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model and the estimation approach
The model we consider is a standard three equations New-Keynesian model, composed of a
log-linearized Euler equation, a forward looking Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule.
The system in log-linear form is:
xt = Et(xt+1) ￿
1
’
(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + e1t (1)
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xt + e2t (2)
it =  rit￿1 + (1 ￿  r)( ￿￿t +  xxt) + e3t (3)
where ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient, ￿ is a parameter
regulating the slope of Phillips curve while ( r; ￿; x) are policy parameters. Here xt is the
output gap, ￿t the in￿ ation rate and it the nominal interest rate. The shocks attached to
each equation may not be structural in the sense that they may represent linear combinations
5of primitive disturbances to the economy. We assume
e1t = ￿1e1t￿1 + v1t (4)
e2t = a12e1t + ￿2e2t￿1 + v2t (5)
e3t = a13e1t + v3t (6)
where ￿1;￿2 capture the persistence of the shocks, a12;a13 the cross equation e⁄ects while
vjt are mean zero processes with variance ￿2
j;j = 1;2;3.
A system of equations like (1)-(3) can be obtained from a standard dynamics stochastic
general equilibrium model with sticky prices, monopolistic competition and preferences
which are additive in consumption and leisure when labor is the only productive factor (see
e.g. Clarida, et. al. (1999)). The speci￿cation of the policy rule is consistent with the
idea that the monetary authority observes current values of the output gap and of in￿ ation
when deciding the current interest rate and that policy changes are smooth, in the sense that
interest rate movements may be persistent. The speci￿cation for the error terms re￿ ects the
fact that the expected level of potential output is omitted from the estimated speci￿cation
and the monetary authorities may pay attention to potential output changes when taking
their decisions (see also An and Schorfheide (2007)); the AR(1) assumption on e1t and e2t,
on the other hand, is quite standard.
Throughout this paper we use a statistically computed measure of the output gap rather
than the deviation of output from the level obtained in the ￿ exible price equilibrium. We
chose this approach for two reasons. First, this choice ensures comparability with previous
work. Second, a ￿ exible price measure which does not take into account capital accumula-
tion is likely to be misspeci￿ed and this may potentially distort inference.
Several authors, including Smets and Wouters (2003), Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez
(2005) and others, have speci￿ed more complicated and realistic structures, which allow for
additional shocks and frictions. Rather than add bells and whistles to the speci￿cation to
generate a model with a good ￿t, we perform our exercises with a simple and internally
consistent speci￿cation, close to those used in theoretical discussions,
The model contains 13 parameters: 6 which have some structural interpretation ￿1 =
6(￿;’;￿; r; x; ￿) and 7 auxiliary ones, ￿2 = (￿1;￿2;a12;a13;￿2
1;￿2
2;￿2
3). Our exercise is
geared to obtain posterior distributions for ￿T = (￿1T;￿2T) over di⁄erent samples T and
to compare the time series properties of their posterior distributions. Our system can be
solved using standard ￿rst order log-linear methods. The solution has a state space format
y1t+1 = A1(￿)y1t + A2(￿)vt+1 (7)
y2t = A3(￿)y1t (8)
where y2t = [￿t;xt;it];y1t = [￿t￿1;xt￿1;it￿1;e1t;e2t;e3t] and the matrices Ai(￿);i = 1;2;3
are nonlinear functions of the structural parameters ￿.
Bayesian estimation of (8) is simple: given some ￿, we compute the likelihood of the
model, denoted by f(yTj￿), by means of the Kalman ￿lter and the prediction error decom-
position. Then, for any speci￿cation of the prior distribution, denoted by g(￿), the posterior
distribution for the parameters is g(￿jyT) =
g(￿)f(yTj￿)
f(y) . The analytical computation of the
posterior is impossible in our setup since the denominator of the expression, f(y), can be
obtained only by integrating g(￿)f(yTj￿) with respect to ￿, a 13 dimensional vector. To ob-
tain numerically a sequence from this unknown posterior, we employ a Metropolis algorithm.
Roughly speaking, given ￿0 and a transition function satisfying regularity conditions, we
can produce a sequence from the unknown posterior, iterating on this transition function,
after discarding an initial set of draws. We choose a standard random walk transition with
jumps which are taken from a normal distribution centered at zero and covariance matrix
equal to a scaled version of the Hessian at the mode. The scale is sample dependent and
chosen to ensure that an appropriate number of draws is accepted (between 20-50 percent).
For each sample we draw 5 chains of 50000 elements each and check convergence using
standard CUMSUM methods. Posterior distributions are constructed using the last 5000
draws from each of the chains.
We assume that the prior distribution can be factored as g(￿) =
Q13
i=1 g(￿i). Prior
distributions are selected according to the following rule: gamma distributions are used for
parameters which must be positive; beta distributions for parameters which must lie in an
interval; normal distributions for all other parameters. This implies that ’;￿ and ￿2
j; j =
71;2;3 have gamma priors, ￿; r;￿1;￿2 have beta priors and that the other parameters have
normal priors, except for  ￿, whose prior is truncated below 1.0. The mean and the standard
deviation of these distributions are in table 1.
Clarida et. al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) among others, have empha-
sized the potential importance of indeterminacies to characterize the US experience over
the last 35 years. Since our prior distribution for the in￿ ation coe¢ cient in the policy rule
is truncated at one, no indeterminacy is allowed. Therefore, the changes we emphasize
are changes within a determinate regime rather than changes across regimes. Canova and
Gambetti (2007) showed that the dynamics induced by this model under indeterminacy
(continuity solution) can be reasonably matched in a system where only determinate equi-
libria are considered. Hence, considering only determinate equilibria is less restrictive than
it may originally appear. Also, since our samples cut across periods with potentially di⁄er-
ent regimes, our prior assumption that the policy coe¢ cient on in￿ ation is larger or equal
to one on average is not inconsistent with the possibility that in particular periods of the
sample such a restriction is not satis￿ed.
The means of the priors are located around standard calibrated values - the one for ￿
re￿ ects a-priori knowledge about its underlying components. The selected standard devi-
ations imply proper but non-informative densities over a range of economically reasonable
parameter values. We select ￿ loose￿priors to minimize subjective information and to allow
the posterior to move away from the prior if the data is informative. Since we maintain the
same prior in every subsample, di⁄erences in the location and in the shape of the posterior
will tell us how much the likelihood evolves over time.
The data is quarterly for the sample 1955:1-2002:1 and it is the same as in Ireland
(2004). The output gap is proxied by GDP in deviation from a linear trend, in￿ ation is
measured as quarter-on-quarter log changes in CPI, and the nominal interest rate we use is
the Federal funds rate. Since output is linearly detrended once and for the whole sample,
trend breaks can not explain the changes we are interested in.
We estimate the model over a number of samples. We start from the [1955:1, 1974:4]
sample and repeat estimation moving the starting and ending date by four years, so as to
8keep the size of the window constant to 20 years. Keeping a ￿xed window size is important
in order to minimize di⁄erences produced by di⁄erent precision of the estimates. The last
subsample is [1983:1-2002:1], which means that we produce 8 posterior distributions for the
parameters.
3 Results
Before we describe the estimation results, we plot in ￿gure 1 the variance of the three
variables in percentage terms in various samples. This plot may help to better understand
the reasons of our study and the estimates we obtain.
Three features of ￿gure 1 are important. First, there is a fall in the variance of in￿ ation
only if the sample starts in, at least, 1982. Samples which include any year preceding
1982 display a variance which is much higher and roughly unchanged. Second, the variance
of the output gap is U-shaped, with the ￿ ex point represented by the 1967-1986 sample.
This means that, for appropriately selected samples, one can claim that the variability of
the output gap has fallen or risen over time (compare, for example, the 1959-1978 and
1983-2002 samples with 1963-1982 and 1983-2002 samples). In general, the absence of a
once-and-for-all break makes the rolling analysis more informative than subsample exercises
when studying the reasons for the changes. Third, the variance of the nominal interest rate
shows a inverted U-shaped pattern. Interesting, the pre-1979 and post-1982 volatilities
are almost identical while any sample which includes part or all of the Volker experiment,
produces a much higher volatility of the nominal interest rate. Once again, our rolling
analysis may shed some light for why this pattern may emerge.
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Figure 1: Variances, di⁄erent samples
3.1 Evidence for subsample estimation
We start by presenting results for the 1955:1-2002:1 sample and for three subsamples com-
monly employed in the literature (1955:1-1979:2, 1979:3-2002:1, 1982:4-2002:1). We are in-
terested in two issues: we want to assess in which dimension the structural system changes
to cope with the time pro￿le of the volatility of output and in￿ ation documented in ￿g-
ure 1; and to see how distorted inference is when potential heterogeneities in the process
generating the data are not accounted for.
Table 1 presents the posterior mean and the highest 95 percent posterior interval (HPI)
for each of the parameters in each sample. This measure, which corresponds to classical
con￿dence intervals, tells us where 95 percent of the mass of the posterior distribution is
located. For distributions which are skewed or multimodal, the interval need not contain
the posterior mean, which is precisely the case for certain subsamples, or could have disjoint
pieces.
10Prior Posterior
1955-2002 1955-1979 1979-2002 1982-2002
Mean Std. Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI
’ 2.0 0.35 0.47 [0.42,0.52] 3.04 [2.67,3.51] 0.87 [0.25,0.41] 0.74 [0.45,1.01]
￿ 0.98 0.01 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.979 [0.97,0.99] 0.97 [0.95,0.99] 0.97 [0.95,0.99]
￿ 2.0 1.0 4.15 [4.10,4.22] 3.42 [3.07,3.93] 3.90 [3.84,4.22] 3.90 [3.42,4.22]
 r 0.8 0.25 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.98 [0.98,0.99]
 x 0.5 0.25 0.02 [0.00,0.08] 0.16 [0.01,0.50] 0.03 [-0.00,0.01] 0.01 [0.00,0.02]
 ￿ 1.3 0.5 1.71 [1.65,1.76] 1.44 [1.42,1.50] 1.54 [1.23,1.53] 1.57 [1.51,1.58]
￿1 0.85 0.25 0.97 [0.97,0.98] 0.94 [0.92,0.94] 0.97 [0.97,0.97] 0.95 [0.94,0.96]
￿2 0.85 0.25 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
￿1 0.01 0.50 0.012 [0.011,0.012] 0.021 [0.016,0.029] 0.012 [0.012,0.012] 0.012 [0.012,0.012]
￿2 0.01 0.50 0.079 [0.071,0.081] 0.047 [0.044,0.061] 0.071 [0.067,0.087] 0.076 [0.065,0.078]
￿3 0.01 0.50 0.156 [0.156,0.167] 0.031 [0.012,0.048] 0.131 [0.132,0.203] 0.146 [0.117,0.160]
a12 0.0 0.25 -0.33 [-0.66,-0.31] 0.01 [-0.48,0.72] -0.00 [-0.40,0.32] -0.01 [-0.46,0.23]
a13 0.0 0.25 0.15 [0.27,0.53] 0.52 [0.10,0.87] 0.02 [-0.22,0.20] -0.10 [-0.51,0.31]
Acceptance rate 0.28 0.55 0.21 0.38
Convergence after 25000 draws 29000 draws 30000 draws 29000 draws
Table 1: Prior and Posterior Moments, Basic rule
There are several interesting aspects of table 1 we would like to emphasize. First, the
samples are informative for all parameters of interest. In fact, the location changes and the
spreads of the posteriors are smaller than those of the prior. Therefore, the identi￿cation
problems Canova and Sala (2006) have highlighted in the context of this model, appear to
be less dramatic with the selected parameterization. The mean estimate of ￿ is typically
larger than the estimates available in the literature (which are of the order of 0.5). We can
obtain mean estimates of ￿ in that range if estimation is performed conditional on a12 = 0.
Hence, one can conjecture that either misspeci￿cation or the impossibility to separate ￿
and a12 is responsible for the di⁄erences.
Second, splitting the sample in two changes the point estimates of the policy parameters,
with full sample estimates been closer to the 1982-2002 estimates. Cross sample variations
in  x and  r are small or insigni￿cant. However, consistent with the conventional wisdom
the second subsamples are characterized by a higher  ￿ and the di⁄erences, at least for
the latest subsample, are statistically signi￿cant - HPIs for the 1955-1979 and 1982-2002
samples do not overlap.
Third, two of the parameters characterizing the private sector, the risk aversion coe¢ -
11cient ’ and the Phillips curve trade-o⁄ ￿, display considerable changes. The point estimate
of ’ dramatically drops in the last two subsamples and the HPIs do not overlap with the
one of the ￿rst sample; the point estimate of ￿ increases, but the uncertainty around the
point estimate is su¢ ciently large to make changes a-posteriori insigni￿cant.
Fourth, using as the second subsample 1979-2002 or 1982-2002 makes little di⁄erence for
the point estimates we obtain. However HPIs do change: excluding the 1979-1982 period
makes the posterior intervals for  ￿;￿2;￿3 smaller and those of ’ and ￿ larger. Since
excluding the Volker experiment from the sample makes information on the location of the
private sector parameters weaker, one must conclude that it is information present in this
period that identi￿es the location of the posterior distribution of these parameters.
Fifth, the covariance matrix of the shocks displays considerable changes. The standard
deviation of the shocks to the Euler equation is larger in the ￿rst subsample, while the
standard deviations of the shocks to the other two equations are larger after 1979. Excluding
the 1979-1982 period does not change the point estimates of the standard deviations but
their HPIs are centered around a lower value if estimation starts at 1982. The covariance
terms have HPIs which are entirely on one side of zero for the full sample but generally not
in the subsamples. Hence, the statistical correlation one ￿nds in the full sample may be
spurious.
Sixth, as table 2 shows, regardless of the sample, the model tends to underestimate the
variance of the output gap, while it overestimates the variance of in￿ ation by a substantial
amount, even 10 times in some samples, when one uses posterior mean estimates to compute
the variabilities implied by the model. Moreover, the actual values of output variability are
in the upper tail of the estimated posterior distribution of output variability of any sample,
while the actual values of the in￿ ation variance are in the very low tail of the estimated
posterior distribution of the in￿ ation variance. In other words, the speci￿cation is too
simple to be able to jointly account for the variability of the two variables. Nevertheless,
the model captures the fall in variability across subsamples: when going from the 1955-1979
sample to the 1979-2002 or 1982-2002 samples the estimated variance of output drops by
about 50 percent (1.61 to 0.60/0.80) and the one of in￿ ation falls by about two-thirds (47.9
121955-20021955-19791979-20021982-2002
Vard(y) 5.76 2.16 1.79 1.38
Vard(￿) 5.95 6.92 4.75 1.06
Basic rule
Mean Posterior Var(y) 3.55 1.61 0.60 0.80
Percentile where Vard(y) lies 83 80 89 90
Mean Posterior Var(￿) 74.13 47.90 12.72 16.39
Percentile where Vard(￿) lies 01 05 13 02
Output growth rule
Mean Posterior Var(y) 0.20 0.18 1.25 1.08
Percentile where Vard(y) lies 100 99 80 82
Mean Posterior Var(￿) 7.50 3.50 26.92 31.84
Percentile where Vard(￿) lies 34 97 03 02
Forward rule
Mean Posterior Var(y) 4.34 0.27 0.11 0.11
Percentile where Vard(y) lies 72 97 98 99
Mean Posterior Var(￿) 13.44 5.47 4.12 2.81
Percentile where Vard(￿) lies 17 60 54 28
Table 2: Data and Estimated Posterior variabilities
to 12.7/16.3).
Campbell and Herkovitz (2006) have suggested that changes in the credit constraints
faced by consumers in the early 1980s could account for the fall in in￿ ation and output
volatilities observed after that date. In their model, volatility drops because labor supply
(and therefore real activity) is very sensitive to shocks when credit constraints are binding
and much less when constraints are relaxed. In our model labor supply decisions are absent,
therefore such an e⁄ect is unmeasured. Nevertheless, changes in the risk aversion coe¢ cient
could play a similar role. In section 5 we study whether variations in the elasticity of the
output gap to real interest rate changes can account for part of the volatility changes.
Arias, et. al, (2006) have argued that to account for the fall in output volatility, one need
not change the parameters of the model across subsamples, but simply allow the variance
of the Solow residuals to be reduced over time. While the model we use is di⁄erent, making
the comparison di¢ cult, our results seem to tell a di⁄erent story. Given that the parameters
of the private sector have changed, the variance of the Phillips curve shock increases, rather
decreases, after 1979 to ￿t the evidence.
The increase in the standard deviation of the shock to the interest rate equation may
13appear odd. However, one should be careful in comparing our estimates to those present
in the literature, since disturbances in the model do not necessarily have a structural inter-
pretation. We have run a VAR with the same three variables and computed the standard
deviation of the reduced form residuals of the interest rate equation in the three subsamples
and found a similar pattern. Hence, to ￿t the time path for the endogenous variables, we
need a combination of changes in the parameters of the model. Given the pattern for the
variance of interest rates presented in ￿gure 1, such combination must include an increase
in the volatility of the residuals of this equation.
Overall, the analysis of this section has highlighted two important conclusions. First,
changes in the parameters of the policy rule do occur but their magnitude is smaller than
often emphasized in the literature. Second, coe¢ cients describing the private sector and the
standard deviation of the shocks display large and signi￿cant changes. The next subsection
examines whether these conclusions remain valid when posterior distributions are obtained
over rolling samples with a window of 20 years.
3.2 Evidence from rolling estimation
We have argued that arbitrarily breaking the sample in two is less than an ideal approach for
what we want to investigate. Two reasons make the results potentially di¢ cult to interpret.
First, using ￿xed subsamples forces all the relationships of the model to break at the same
date - clearly violating what we have displayed in ￿gure 1 - and this may induce important
biases. Second, the pattern that the level and the variability of output and interest rates
displays does not ￿t well into the null of stability nor the alternative of a permanent jump.
Therefore, the conclusions one draws may be highly sensitive to the choice of break date.
Our rolling estimation approach does not entirely solve these problems. To account for
them we would need to estimate the model allowing structural parameters to be fully time
varying. Nevertheless, by comparing posterior estimates over di⁄erent samples, we can
provide a more robust characterization of the changes observed over that last 35 years than
simply using (￿xed) subsample analysis.
We plot the posterior mean (straight line) and HPI estimates (dashed lines) obtained
14in the 8 subsamples for the parameters of interest in ￿gure 2. The ￿gure con￿rms and
quali￿es the conclusions we have previously reached. There are considerable variations in
both the posterior mean and the posterior HPI for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
’ over samples. While variations are present in samples which include years before 1982,
it is only after that date that the fall becomes considerable and signi￿cant. The Phillips
curve trade-o⁄ ￿ is increasing over time in a manner which is consistent with the previous








































































































Figure 2: Posterior mean estimates and HPI, di⁄erent samples
The Phillips curve trade-o⁄ in more structural versions of the model we consider is typ-
ically regulated by a (nonlinear) function of four parameters: the coe¢ cient of relative risk
15aversion, the inverse elasticity of labor supply, the discount factor, and the price stickiness
parameter. While there is little evidence that the price stickiness parameter has changed
over time, at least in micro studies, and since estimates of the discount factor do not display
important variations over the samples, one must conclude that variations in the intertem-
poral elasticity of labor supply must counteract variations in the risk aversion coe¢ cient
and give the mild trend we observe in ￿. It is tempting to associate this trend with the
changes that the US labor market experienced over period (higher female participation,
larger number of migrant workers, etc.). However, one should realize that more general
speci￿cations of the model (for example, with decreasing returns to scale production) pro-
duce more complicated Phillips curve trade-o⁄ where other parameters enter. Rather than
forcing an explanation on a model which is not designed to do this, we leave the question
of what drives the trend in ￿ for future research.
The parameters of the policy rule display minor variations across samples: HPIs for
di⁄erent samples almost always overlap, except for the coe¢ cients on the output gap. Con-
sistent with the analysis of Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the pattern present in ￿gure 2
squares well with the idea that none of the three policy coe¢ cients has permanently shifted
over time. Also, consistent with Canova and Gambetti (2004), our recursive posterior analy-
sis shows that the policy rule during Burns and Greenspan tenures were not too di⁄erent.
Taking for granted that the policy rule represents the actual policy well over the entire
period, HPIs for the policy coe¢ cients in the earlier and the later samples overlap.
Fourth, the standard deviation of two of the three disturbances (￿2;￿3) display con-
siderable variations over subsamples. Since also the covariance parameters - not displayed
here - display this feature, it is the entire covariance structure of the disturbances that is
signi￿cantly altered over time.
Given these results, the temptation to associate variations in the variance of the output
gap over time with changes in ’ and variations in the variances of in￿ ation and interest
rates with changes in the covariance structure of the disturbances is strong. To make the
link more transparent we estimate in section 5 restricted systems where certain parameters
are ￿xed at their 1955-1974 mean value. By comparing restricted vs. unrestricted estimates
16one can obtain a formal indication of what parameters contributed most to the variations
in the variance of output and in￿ ation.
3.3 Robustness
The model we employ is rather standard. However, the speci￿cation of its details may be
subject to some debate. In particular, while we have chosen to work with a policy rule
where the nominal interest rate depends on the current output gap and current in￿ ation,
a policy rule speci￿ed in terms of current output growth and current in￿ ation is probably
equally reasonable. Furthermore, some literature (see e.g. Clarida et. al. (2000), Boivin and
Giannoni (2006)) speci￿es a forward looking rule where the current interest rate responds
to future expected changes in the output gap and in in￿ ation. Would the main conclusions
change if one of these alternative rules is used? Evidence on this issue is in tables 3 and
4, which report posterior means and HPIs for the full sample and the three subsamples
presented in table 1, for the two alternative rules. Results obtained using rolling samples
are comparable and therefore not presented.
Prior Posterior
1955-2002 1955-1979 1979-2002 1982-2002
Mean Std. Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI
’ 2.0 0.35 3.05 [2.58,3.56] 3.02 [2.61,3.22] 2.61 [2.02,3.06] 2.27 [1.80,2.52]
￿ 0.98 0.01 0.98 [0.96,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.97 [0.98,0.99]
￿ 2.0 1.0 4.11 [4.02,4.22] 2.66 [2.28,3.17] 2.97 [2.58,3.38] 3.90 [3.29,3.91]
￿r 0.8 0.25 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
￿x 0.5 0.25 0.52 [0.14,0.99] 0.47 [0.08,0.81] 0.42 [-0.10,0.86] 0.52 [0.12,1.01]
￿￿ 1.3 0.5 1.42 [1.32,1.43] 2.22 [1.87,2.64] 1.22 [1.11,1.34] 1.15 [1.07,1.22]
￿x 0.85 0.25 0.88 [0.88,0.90] 0.83 [0.80,0.84] 0.76 [0.75,0.78] 0.71 [0.68,0.73]
￿p 0.85 0.25 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
￿1 0.01 0.50 0.012 [0.012,0.012] 0.042 [0.040,0.045] 0.037 [0.029,0.045] 0.046 [0.037,0.055]
￿2 0.01 0.50 0.052 [0.047,0.060] 0.019 [0.015,0.020] 0.020 [0.016,0.024] 0.015 [0.013,0.019]
￿3 0.01 0.50 0.122 [0.106,0.130] 0.062 [0.051,0.086] 0.101 [0.085,0.118] 0.095 [0.081,0.109]
a12 0.0 0.25 1.39 [0.88, 1.59] 1.52 [1.42,1.59] 1.47 [1.36,1.59] 1.42 [1.30,1.59]
Acceptance rate 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.36
Convergence after 21.000 draws 20.000 draws 21.000 draws 18.000 draws
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Moments, Output growth rule
It is well known that the statistical output gap proxy we use is subject to a large
amount of measurement error. Consequently, estimates of the structural parameters may
17fail to have the ￿ right￿magnitudes because a large amount of measurement error is present
in each sample. We have already argued that model based measures of the output gap
do not seem to be the solution as they are typically obtained disregarding the role of the
capital stock. Since Orphanides (2004) has argued that measurement errors are signi￿cantly
reduced if output growth is used in place of the output gap, it is worth investigating what
happens to our estimates when we employ this new policy equation.
Table 3 indicates that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ’ falls but now the fall
is much more limited in magnitude. Nevertheless, HPIs for the 1955-1979 and 1982-2002
samples do not overlap. Estimates of the Phillips curve trade-o⁄ ￿ increase as with the
output gap measure, but now the magnitude of the increase is much larger and the HPIs for
the 1955-1979 and 1982-2002 samples do not overlap. As a consequence of these changes,
the standard deviation of the shocks to the ￿rst two equations shows a pattern which is the
opposite of what we had in table 1: the standard deviation of the disturbance to the Euler
equation slightly increases, while the one of the Phillips curve decreases. Surprisingly, the
coe¢ cient on in￿ ation in the policy rule falls when we move from the pre-1979 to the post
1979 samples and the fall is signi￿cant. Taken at face value this implies that the policy
rule has become less aggressive in responding to in￿ ation since the beginning of the 1980s.
While this may be due to the fact that in￿ ation expectations were much less volatile in
the 1980s, and therefore in￿ ation stabilization may require a smaller coe¢ cient, one should
also recognize that di⁄erences across samples may re￿ ect model misspeci￿cations. The time
pro￿le of the standard deviation of the disturbance of the interest rate equation suggests
that this is probably the case. Hence, despite being large, changes in the policy parameters
account for little of the variations in interest rates.
Table 2 indicates that even with this policy rule the model has hard time to mimic the
variability of the output gap and in￿ ation, regardless of whether we use mean estimates or
the percentiles where the actual values lies. As in the previous case, the variance of the
output gap is underestimated and the one of in￿ ation is typically overestimated but the
magnitude of the discrepancy is larger with the former than with the latter. However, the
estimates we obtain imply no volatility moderation.
18Prior Posterior
1955-2002 1955-1979 1979-2002 1982-2002
Mean Std. Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI Mean HPI
’ 2.0 0.35 2.56 [1.81,2.90] 2.36 [2.61,3.22] 2.71 [2.63,2.93] 2.05 [1.62,2.74]
￿ 0.98 0.01 0.98 [0.97,0.98] 0.97 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.98,0.98] 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
￿ 2.0 1.0 3.27 [2.79,3.67] 2.93 [2.28,3.17] 3.97 [3.88,4.22] 3.48 [3.18,3.66]
￿r 0.8 0.25 0.98 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99]
￿x 0.5 0.25 0.21 [0.06,0.28] -0.01 [0.08,0.81] 0.32 [0.29,0.39] -0.01 [-0.02,0.00]
￿￿ 1.3 0.5 1.34 [1.00,1.46] 1.02 [1.00,1.05] 1.69 [1.65,1.72] 1.52 [1.24,1.76]
￿x 0.85 0.25 0.93 [0.93,0.95] 0.95 [0.94,0.95] 0.91 [0.90,0.91] 0.91 [0.89,0.92]
￿p 0.85 0.25 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.99 [0.99,0.99] 0.96 [0.96,0.97] 0.98 [0.98,0.98]
￿2
1 0.01 0.50 0.027 [0.020,0.032] 0.012 [0.012,0.013] 0.027 [0.022,0.030] 0.012 [0.012,0.014]
￿2
2 0.01 0.50 0.028 [0.018,0.052] 0.061 [0.063,0.063] 0.161 [0.128,0.193] 0.066 [0.049,0.068]
￿2
3 0.01 0.50 0.015 [0.012,0.015] 0.026 [0.024,0.031] 0.046 [0.041,0.055] 0.035 [0.032,0.043]
a12 0.0 0.25 -1.05 [-1.59,-0.66] 0.13 [-0.37,0.03] 0.07 [0.03,0.07] 0.10 [0.02,0.07]
a13 0.0 0.25 1.25 [0.79, 1.46] 0.13 [0.25,0.35] 0.13 [0.10,0.13] 0.10 [0.10,0.14]
Acceptance rate 0.50 0.25 0.30 0.43
Convergence after 22.000 draws 21.000 draws 19.000 draws 19.000 draws
Table 4: Prior and Posterior Moments, Forward rule
With a policy rule which reacts to expected changes in the output gap and in￿ ation,
results are roughly similar. ’ falls as we move from the earlier to the later part of the
sample but changes are smaller and the HPI of di⁄erent samples overlap. ￿ increases over
time making the Phillips curve trade-o⁄ ￿ atter and changes are a-posteriori signi￿cant. ￿￿
increases in the later part of the sample and the increase is now signi￿cant a-posteriori.
With this speci￿cation of the policy rule, the mean estimate is on the boundary of the
stability region in the ￿rst subsample suggesting that the likelihood of the data may be
very sensitive to the speci￿cation of the policy rule. Once again, changes in the parameters
of the policy rule account for little of the variations in the nominal interest rates and the
changes in the standard deviation of the disturbance seem to do largely the job of matching
the time path of the variance of interest rates.
A speci￿cation with a forward rule appears to be better in matching in￿ ation variability
than the original one but worse in matching output variability (see table 2). Furthermore,
while it can reproduce the fall in the variances of the two variables in the last two subsamples,
the fall in in￿ ation in the 1982-2002 sample is small relative to the one observed in the data.
Overall, these alternative policy rules produce results which are qualitatively similar to
19the ones obtained in the baseline case, as far as trends in crucial parameter estimates are
concerned. However, they seem to face more important problems in matching either the
level or the decline in the volatility of output and in￿ ation over the subsamples.
4 A comparison with the literature
Our ￿ndings may seem puzzling relative to what it is currently available in the literature,
except perhaps for Gordon (2005). Hence, it is worth spending some time to discuss in
what way our results are di⁄erent and what can account for them.
To start with, we would like to point out three facts. First, our structural estimation
does ￿nd an increase in the in￿ ation coe¢ cient of the policy rule when moving from a sample
including the 1970s to a sample which excludes them. What we show is that the variations
are not statistically large relative to those in other parameters. Second, time variations in
parameters other than the policy ones are often detected when the model is estimated using
systemwide methods (see Ireland (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), among others), but
they are left undiscussed. Third, direct structural estimation typically leads to conclusions
that are di⁄erent from those obtained by estimating structural VARs with or without time
varying coe¢ cients - the former mainly ￿nds changes in the parameters of the model; the
latter mainly changes in the covariance matrix of shocks. In some cases, this is due to the
fact that variations in the standard deviations of the shocks cannot be identi￿ed with the
chosen objective function (see e.g. Boivin and Giannoni (2006)); in others to speci￿cation
choices which impose particular structure on the estimated structural shocks. Our ￿ndings,
which are obtained conditioning on a model, are consistent with the VAR evidence.
Relative to Clarida et. al (2000), who use single equation structural estimation, we
take a system wide estimation approach and use Bayesian rather than classical techniques.
While the second di⁄erence may be of minor importance since the priors are su¢ ciently non-
informative over the ranges we choose, the ￿rst one is important. Single equation methods
may produce a distorted view of the structural relationships when important endogeneities
are present (see also Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)). In addition, since they do not take into
account system wide relationships, nor do they use the cross equation restrictions present
20in the model, they are ine¢ cient.
In comparison with Boivin and Giannoni (2006), who use a minimum distance estimator
to obtain parameter estimates, our approach has the advantage of allowing a better identi-
￿cation of the structural relationships. Canova and Sala (2006) have shown that minimum
distance estimators when used to back out parameters of a new Keynesian model from the
responses to monetary shocks face severe identi￿cation problems - the objective function is
very ￿ at and ridges are present. This means that variations in the coe¢ cients identi￿ed by
this procedure could be points of equivalent height on this surface or could represent varia-
tions linked to variations in the other parameters. On the contrary, the likelihood function
of the system is much more peaked and displays much easily disentangable relationships
among the parameters (see also Linde￿(2005)). Two additional reasons may explain the
di⁄erent ￿ndings. First, the authors adjusts the estimated speci￿cation in order to achieve
the best possible ￿t - endowing the theoretical model with ad-hoc exogenous frictions and
searching among the (forward) speci￿cations of the policy rule the one which best ￿t the
interest rate data - while we take a textbook speci￿cation and do no preliminary data min-
ing exercises. Table 4 shows that it is possible to roughly reproduce the pattern of point
estimates they obtain with a one-period forward looking rule and no ad-hoc frictions. How-
ever, Boivin and Giannoni neglect the fact that pretesting downsizes the standard errors
of their estimates. Hence, changes which are a-posteriori insigni￿cant, may look arti￿cially
signi￿cant. Second, while the counterfactual exercises of Boivin and Giannoni are subject
to the Lucas￿critique - agents behave as if there will never be a structural break and when
the break occurs they learn immediately that they will never be any break in the future -
the exercises we conduct in section 5 are largely free of these problems. As a matter of fact,
the majority of the counterfactual exercises performed in the literature su⁄er from various
types of inconsistencies which makes results uninterpretable. For example, the practice of
switching coe¢ cients and variances across samples does not take into account the correla-
tion structure of estimates and the fact that the parameters/variances estimates obtained
in a sample may be in the tails of estimated distribution of parameters/variances estimates
in another sample.
21Relative to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), who also employ system wide methods and
Bayesian estimation on a model similar to ours, two important di⁄erences need to be men-
tioned. First, the policy rule they estimate uses output growth. As shown in table 2, this
choice has some consequences for the results but does not change the main features of the
conclusions one reaches. The second di⁄erence is that they allow for indeterminacy (and
sunspots) in the estimation, while we don￿ t. Consequently, this work complements rather
than substitutes theirs.
Finally, several papers have estimated structural VARs with or without time variations
in the coe¢ cients (see e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2001), (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2004),
Sims and Zha (2006) among others). While most of them are concerned with estimates of
the policy rules and of the monetary policy shock, some papers have tried to estimate
sources of variations in systems which have similarities with the model in section 2 (see
e.g. Gambetti et. al. (2005)). Our results help to explain some of their ￿ndings. For
example, the large impact that supply shocks have in explaining the time pro￿le of the
volatility and persistence of output is consistent with the time pro￿le of the estimates of
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the log-linearized Euler equation. Moreover, the
fall in the standard deviation of the supply shocks over time they ￿nd is due, in part, to
the change in the Phillips curve trade-o⁄ ￿.
5 What change explains the Great Moderation?
The analysis so far has documented the presence of generalized parameter instabilities over
the samples under consideration and shown that only variations in certain parameters are
statistically signi￿cant. In this section we ask which of these changes contributes most to
the changes in the variance of output and in￿ ation documented in ￿gure 1. In particular,
suppose we repeat estimation over the 1983-2002 subsample, ￿xing some parameters to their
1955-1974 posterior mean estimates. Would the ￿t of the model change? Would the model
reproduce the fall in the volatility of output and in￿ ation observed in this sample?
When examining which feature of the model is responsible for the Great Moderation,
one typically performs counterfactual exercises where parameters for di⁄erent subsamples
22are switched and interesting statistics are recomputed under these alternative parameter
values. As we have mentioned, while popular in the literature (see e.g. Stock and Watson
(2002), Biovin and Giannoni (2006)), these exercises cannot credibly answer the question
of interest. Our approach, which allows unrestricted parameters to be readjusted in the
estimation, can provide a more reasonable scenario to evaluate the economic consequences
of parameter changes.
Table 5 reports estimates of the variance of the output gap and in￿ ation obtained
in the unrestricted speci￿cation and in three restricted speci￿cations where, in turn, the
parameters describing the private sector behavior (’;￿), the policy rule (￿x;￿r;￿￿), and
the standard deviations of the shocks (￿1;￿2;￿3) are constrained to have a prior mean equal
to the posterior mean of the 1955-1974 subsample and a very small variance (0.0001). Table
5 also reports the posterior probability of each model and the risk of matching the variance
of output and in￿ ation of the unrestricted model with each restricted speci￿cation.
Posterior probabilities are computed using the prior probability of each restricted spec-
i￿cation (set to one-third) and their marginal likelihood. The marginal likelihood is a
synthetic measure of ￿t, comparable to ￿ R2 in linear models: a higher marginal likelihood
obtains if a model ￿ts the data better, given a common prior, or if the prior of one model
is closer to the likelihood, given a common likelihood. Since the experiments we conduct
involve changing both the likelihood and the prior of the parameters, the marginal likeli-
hood is altered through both channels. We compute marginal likelihoods using a modi￿ed
harmonic mean estimator and 10 chains of parameter draws (see e.g. Geweke (1998)).
The risk measure is computed by comparing the volatilities of output and in￿ ation
produced by each restricted speci￿cation to the ones of the unrestricted speci￿cation under
an absolute loss function, equally weighting the two volatilities by the posterior probability
of each restricted speci￿cation. This type of measure, popularized in Schorfheide (2000), is
useful to compare models which are likely to be misspeci￿ed and therefore may have very
low posterior probability. We also computed a risk measure using a quadratic loss function
or a loss which asymmetrically weights only positive deviations from the volatilities of the
basic speci￿cation. The results we present are robust with respect to these choices. To
23interpret the risk measure note that if time variations in one set of parameters are relatively
unimportant (important), the posterior probability of the restricted speci￿cation will be
high (low) and the risk relatively high (low).
UnrestrictedRestricting ’;￿Restricting  x; r￿￿ Restricting ￿2
j; j = 1;2;3
Vard(Y) 1.38
Vard(￿) 1.06
Var(Y) 0.80 0.05 2.98 4.57
Var(￿) 16.39 1.27 47.04 14.97
Posterior
Probability 0.999 3.0e-23 2.7e-82
Risk 21.19 2.0 e-21 1.2e-81
Table 5: Posterior Moments, Probabilities and Risk, restricted and unrestricted speci￿ca-
tions, sample 1983-2002
Table 5 indicates that variations in the parameters of the private sector induce changes
that go in the opposite directions of those we are interested here. In fact, if we keep them
￿xed at the posterior mean value estimated over the 1955-1974 sample, the fall in the
variance of output and in￿ ation implied by the model would have been much larger than
in the unrestricted case. Hence, changes in ’ and ￿ can not be the drivers of the ￿ Great
Moderation￿ . Restricting the parameters of the policy rule to their 1955-1974 posterior
mean values implies that the variability of output and in￿ ation would have counterfactually
increased rather than decreased over the 1982-2002 sample. Hence, the Great Moderation
would not have occurred if policy parameters were invariant over the sample. Finally,
restrictions on the volatility of the shocks have minor e⁄ects on the variance of in￿ ation,
but considerable e⁄ects on the variance of output. Consequently, the fall in the variances
of output and in￿ ation may have distinct causes: output volatility declines because of a
combination of causes, among which the fall in the standard deviation of the shocks is the
most important one. The fall in the variance of in￿ ation, on the other hand, appears to be
largely due to changes in the parameters of the policy rule.
How can one explain the extreme posterior probabilities of table 5? To start with,
one should notice that Euler equation shocks are those with the lowest variability in all
the samples. Therefore, given a shock of this type, changing the coe¢ cient of relative
24risk aversion produces only small changes in the volatility of the output gap and, given
the changes in the Phillips curve trade-o⁄, this implies small variations in the volatility
of in￿ ation. On the contrary, small variations in the coe¢ cients of the policy rule imply
considerably di⁄erent covariance matrices of the shocks and therefore large e⁄ects on the
volatility of output and in￿ ation. Finally, ￿xing the standard deviation of the shocks forces
the parameters of the policy rule to change dramatically (for example, the output coe¢ cient
goes from 0.11 in the unrestricted speci￿cation to 0.99 when we ￿x the standard deviation
of the shocks) and this has important consequences on the volatility of output produced by
the model.
In sum, changes in the parameters of the policy rule and the variability of the shocks are
crucial to understand the Great Moderation and, relatively speaking, posterior probabilities
and risk measures suggest that time variations in the standard deviation of the shocks are
the most important cause of the observed variations.
The results of this section should be seen as a warning against taking the results of
statistical estimation at face value. Variations which are statistically large produce small
economic consequences. On the contrary, small statistical variations, like those experienced
in the parameters of the policy rule, may generate important economic implications because
of the e⁄ects they have on the covariance structure of the shocks.
6 Conclusions
This paper recursively estimates a conventional small scale DSGE model using US post-
WWII data and Bayesian techniques. The model belongs to the class of New-Keynesian
structures that have been extensively used in the current literature for welfare and policy
analyses. Bayesian techniques are preferable to standard likelihood methods or to indirect
inference (impulse response matching) exercises, especially for models like the one we con-
sider, which are clearly false and misspeci￿ed. We show that the model and the methodology
are useful tools to understand the nature of the changes generating the so-called ￿ Great
Moderation￿ .
We estimate the model a number of times using a di⁄erent starting date, keeping the
25window size ￿xed, and analyze the role of changes in the private sector parameters, in the
coe¢ cients of the policy rule and in the covariance structure of the shocks. We ￿nd that
changes over time in the parameters of the private sector are the largest and the most
signi￿cant and tend to make the output gap be more elastic to changes in the real rate and
in￿ ation to be more reactive to marginal costs. Changes in the covariance structure of the
shocks are also considerable while changes in the coe¢ cients of the policy rule are small
and a-posteriori insigni￿cant.
Nevertheless, when we analyze which of these changes help to explain better the Great
Moderation episode, we ￿nd that the changes in the parameters of the private sector alone
cannot generate the observed fall in the variance of output and in￿ ation while changes in
the parameters of the policy rule and the covariance of the shocks can. We also show that
the fall in variances of output and in￿ ation appear to have di⁄erent causes, suggesting that
the quest for one common explanation to both facts is probably misplaced.
The results stand mid-way relative to those in the literature. As in structural VAR
analyses, Canova and Gambetti (2004), Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006), we
￿nd evidence that the shocks hitting the economy have considerably changed over time.
Also, consistently with the analyses of McConnell and Perez Quiroz (2001), Gordon (2005)
and Campbell and Herkovitz (2006), we detect statistical changes in the parameters of the
private sector, but the changes matter very little to explain the Great Moderation episode.
Finally, while policy parameters change little, they seem to matter quite a lot.
Our work has a number of limitations which we would like to spell out in detail. As
we have mentioned, our analysis imposes the restriction that within each sample only a
determinate equilibrium is present. This is relatively common in the literature (see e.g.
Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez (2005) or Fernandez Villaverde and Rubio Ramirez (2007))
and, for the rolling analysis we perform, the restriction is probably less important that one
would initially think. An obvious extension of what we have done here would be to allow
for indeterminacies in every subsample and check whether rolling analysis would con￿rm or
disproof our conclusions.
Second, our estimation approach, while convenient, imposes a form of irrationality on
26agents￿behavior. In fact, the analysis implicitly assumes that agents have rational expec-
tations within each sample where estimation is conducted but not over the entire sample -
they never take into account the fact that changes in the structural parameters may occur.
To fully take this into account the techniques recently developed by Fernandez Villaverde
and Rubio Ramirez (2007), which use higher order approximations to agents￿decision rules
and more complicated Monte Carlo techniques, need to be employed. This option, however,
requires considerable computational time even in a model with only three equations.
Third, as we have argued in the introduction, the model is taken o⁄-the-shelf and not
optimized to ￿t the data in any sense. Therefore, there is always the possibility that
misspeci￿cation, omitted variables or shocks drive the results. To fully understand the
sources of the Great Moderation, one should probably employ a larger scale model which
￿ts the data better than the simple speci￿cation we consider. Such an extension is relatively
straightforward to undertake, but again requires considerable computational time.
Finally, while it is common to look at the US and only at output and in￿ ation, there
are obvious reasons to ask whether other variables display similar behavior and whether
common explanations for the international patterns documented e.g. in Stock and Watson
(2004) or Canova et. al. (2007), could be found. A cross-country perspective can be
fundamental in understanding the source of variations because we know a lot about the
policy changes and the dates at which they occurred in countries other than the US. We
leave all these issues for future research.
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